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Figure 5: User Perceived Quality of Shortlisted Rec-
ommendations
convergence experiments. In this case, each recommend-
ing agent builds up its strategy proﬁle from its knowledge
about the bids with respect to its 20 internal quality seg-
ments. Speciﬁcally, Figure 6(a) shows the bidding prices
for diﬀerent segments of the recommending agent with the
internal quality distribution N(0.65,0.1
2) in the above sim-
ulation. From Figure 6(a), we can see that the price from
the segment 0.65∼0.70 (with the majority of samples) keeps
rising before the 60
th auction (the market convergence) and
oscillates around 160 (the equilibrium price for recommen-
dations from the segment 0.65∼0.70) afterwards. This is be-
cause the agent raises its price from a low initial bid to chase
the equilibrium price before the market converges and alters
its price to minimize the diﬀerence between its bids and the
equilibrium price so as to maximize its revenue. From Fig-
ure 6(a), we can also see that the agent’s prices for segments
0.55∼0.60 and 0.75∼0.80 converge at about 130 and 170 re-
spectively. Figure 6(a) indicates that the agent is capable of
“learning” from the marketplace to alter its bids to certain
levels in order to chase the equilibrium price. The solid line
in Figure 6(b) (marked “Bidder 1”) plots this agent’s strat-
egy proﬁle and the dashed and dotted lines represent the
strategy proﬁles of the two recommending agents with the
internal quality distributions N(0.5,0.1
2) and N(0.35,0.1
2).
From our observation of various simulations, a recommend-
ing agent’s strategy proﬁle changes quickly before the mar-
ket converges and then becomes relatively stable after the
convergence. This tells us that the marketplace delivers a
clear incentive to recommending agents enabling them to bid
rationally and that agents with diﬀerent recommendation
methods are capable of relating their bids to their internal
qualities by forming a steady strategy proﬁle.
Now we are going to remove the second assumption made
when designing the user agent in subsection 3.1. Once the
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Figure 6: Strategy Proﬁle
ﬁrst assumption holds (meaning there is a steady relation-
ship Q = f(q) given that q ∼ N(µ,σ
2)) irrespect of whatever
f is (whether k > 0 or not and whether f is linear or not),
given a speciﬁc value of q, there a steady value of Q (= f(q))
always arises. Therefore, an agent with this speciﬁc method
can always alter its price of q to the equilibrium price with
respect to Q, if there are suﬃcient samples from the inter-
nal quality segment containing q. For example, if the user
agent assigns Q to recommendations from the agent in Fig-
ure 6(a) following a behaviour of Q = k · q + b (k < 0),
the solid line in Figure 6(b) will have an overall tendency to
decrease. Therefore, the recommending agents can always
generate their strategy proﬁles without assumption 2 once
assumption 1 holds.
Stability. To evaluate the stability of the market with re-
spect to bidding strategies, we now consider what happens
if some of the agents take a greedy strategy (bid as much
as possible to outbid others). To this end, we select one
recommending agent as the greedy bidder and the other
agents still take the strategy introduced in subsection 2.2.
All recommending agents are endowed with an initial credit
of 65535. The greedy bidder always bids much higher than
the others to get its recommendations shortlisted so as to
make proﬁt. However, this greedy bidder does not receive
any more rewards from its recommendations when compared
with the rewarded recommendations provided by the other
non-greedy bidders. This is because the reward is not based
on the bid price, but rather on the user perceived quality.
With the same amount of reward with respect to the same